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THIRD COUNTRY DEPORTATION

SARAH SHERMAN-STOKES

The large-scaledeportation of noncitizensfrom the UnitedStates is not new.
However, the speed, and secrecy, by which many of these deportations are
carried out is unprecedented. Deportations are, increasingly, executed not
through a legal courtprocess, but rather, extrajudicially-indetention centers
and at border crossings, outside the purview ofjudges or neutral adjudicators.
One kind of this "shadow deportation" is what I term "third country
deportation"-theremoval ofnoncitizens to a country other than that designated
by an ImmigrationJudge, after reliefto the designatedcountry has been granted,
and after the courtproceedinghas concluded.
This article builds upon the work of other scholars who have illuminated
deportations that occur in the shadows-including expedited removal,
administrative removal and reinstatement of removal-all of which happen
quickly, and largely without judicial review. This article argues that "third
country deportations"are not only part of this growing, and dangerous, trend

toward deportations that happen outside the courtroom, but that they are in
direct violation of both our domestic and internationallegal obligations. In fact,
third country deportationsplace already vulnerable noncitizens at risk of being
removed to countries where they face persecution and torture, without the
process and judicial oversight that a court proceedingprovides. In order to
comply with our legal obligations, this article contends that notice, burden
shifting, and afull evidentiary hearingare requiredwhen the government seeks
to remove a noncitizen to a country other than that designatedby an Immigration
Judge.

* Clinical Associate Professor and Associate Director of the Immigrants' Rights & Human
Trafficking Program, Boston University School of Law; J.D. Boston College Law School; B.A.
Bates College. I would like to thank Danielle Citron, Katherine Evans, Lindsay Harris, Laila Hlass,
Mary Holper, Rebecca Ingber, Karen Pita Loor, Naomi Mann, Shoba Wadhia Sivaprasad, Beth
Zilberman and participants in the 2019 NYU Clinical Law Review Writer's Workshop for their
thoughtful feedback on earlier drafts of this Article. Special thanks to Chloe Sugino and Brian
Flaherty for excellent research assistance, and to law students Maggie Loeffelholz and Laura
Putnam, and attorney SangYeob Kim at the ACLU of New Hampshire for their tremendous work
on "Peter's" case. Thank you to Boston University School of Law for the support needed to
complete this Article. And, finally, thank you to "Peter" for letting me tell part of his story. All
errors are my own.
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"Peter"' was born in Khartoum, Sudan, in the midst of the second Sudanese
civil war. Following the murder of his father and kidnapping of his mother, Peter
and his family were brought to the United States as refugees. Soon after, trouble
with the law landed Peter in immigration detention and facing deportation to
Sudan. After he was granted relief under the Convention Against Torture
("CAT"), Peter was released from immigration detention and spent the next seven
years living and working in New England. Then, in 2018, Peter was arrested by
immigration officials, detained, and told he would be removed to South Sudan,
a country to which he had no connection. In fact, the Department of Homeland
Security ("DHS") intended to carry out his deportation without notice, a hearing,
or process of any kind.
To place Peter's story in context, several trends in immigration detention and
the number of people seeking humanitarian protection, including relief under
CAT, should be noted. Like Peter, a record number of more than 54,000 people
2
are currently being held in ICE custody across the United States. Thousands of
these detainees are torture survivors or likely to face torture if removed to their
countries of origin.3 Fiscal Year 2018 showed a 40-percent jump in the number
4
of decisions made by immigration judges regarding fear-based relief, which
5
includes asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under CAT. This spike in

1. "Peter" is a pseudonym for one of the author's clients. Identifying details have been
slightly altered here to protect his identity. Additional background on Peter is provided, infra, in
Part I.
2. Yuki Noguchi, No Meaningful Oversight': ICE Contractor Overlooked Problems at
Detention Centers,NPR (July 17,2019,5:48 PM), https-/www.npr.org/2019/07/17/741181529/nom ean ingful-oversight-ice-contractor-overlooked-problems-at-detention-centers

[https-J/perma.cc/A43J-6T7G].
3. While definitive numbers are difficult to ascertain, estimates include more than 6,000
victims of torture in ICE detention, and approximately 1.3 million survivors of torture living in the
United States. Annie Sovcik, Tortured & Detained: Survivor Stories of U.S. ImmigrationDetention,
CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF TORTURE 5 (Nov. 2, 2013), httpsJ/www.cvt.org/sites/default/files/Report
TorturedAndDetainedNov20l3.pdf [https//perma.cc/M7VX-VDLS] (From FY2010 to FY2013
the Center for Victims of Torture ("CVT") estimates that the U.S. detained over 6,000 victims of
torture); Craig Higson-Smith, Updating the Number of Refugees Resettled in the UnitedStates Who
Have Suffered Torture, CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF TORTURE (Sept. 2015), https-/www.cvt.org/sites/
default/files/SurvivorNumberMetaAnalysis_ Sept20 I5_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7QU-NMYY]
(According to a meta-data study from CVT, there are an estimated 1.3 million survivors of torture
living in the United States.).

4. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2012) (asylum statute); 8 C.F.R. § 208.13 (2019) (asylum
regulations); 8 U.S.C. § 123 1(b)(3)(B) (2018) (withholding of removal statute); see also 8 C.F.R.
§208.16 (2019) (regulations concerning withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (b)(3)(B) and
the Convention Against Torture); 8 C.F.R. § 208.17 (2019) (regulations concerning Deferral of
Removal under the Convention Against Torture).
TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS CLEARINGHOUSE IMMIGRATION PROJECT, Asylum

Decisions
5 39

/

5.

and Denials Jump in 2018, (Nov. 29, 2018), httpsJ/trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/
[https://perma.cc/9NP9-BX9J] [hereinafter TRACIMMIGRATION].

THIRD COUNTRY DEPORTATION

2020]

335

the number of immigration judge decisions regarding fear-based relief was a more
than 89-percent increase from two years ago.6 Fear-based relief, including relief
under CAT, is increasingly sought, and meaningful when received, hypothetically
ensuring that recipients are not removed to countries where they will be
persecuted, harmed, tortured, or killed. Over the last several years, however, there
has been a slow, but steady, erosion of basic protections under our asylum laws.'
What's more, noncitizens facing deportation are not entitled to a lawyer except
at their own expense'-which means that many noncitizens seeking fear-based
protection in U.S. immigration courts are unrepresented.' With asylum under

6. Id.
7. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-208,

§302(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV), 110 Stat. 3009-582 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.)
(1996); Exec. Order No. 13,841, 83 Fed. Reg. 29,435, Affording Congress an Opportunity to
Address Family Separation, § 3 (June 20, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidentialactions/affordingcongress-opportunity-address-family-separation
[https://perma.cc/2E7R-524K];
Matter of M-S-, 27 I. & N. 509 (A.G. 2019) (overruling Matter of X-K-, 23 I. & N. 731 (BIA
2005), and holding that asylum seekers who have established a credible fear of persecution are
ineligible for bond); Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. 316 (A.G. 2018) (overturning Matter of A-R-C-G-,
26 I. & N. 338 (BIA 2014)); Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal; Credible Fear
and Reasonable Fear Review, 85 Fed. Reg. 115 (proposed Jun. 15, 2020) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R.
§§ 1003, 1208, 1235); Order Suspending Introduction of Persons From a Country Where a
Communicable Disease Exists, 85 Fed. Reg. 16567 (proposed Mar. 24, 2020) (to be codified at 42
C.F.R. 71); Implementing Bilateral and Multilateral Asylum Cooperative Agreements Under the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 84 Fed. Reg. 223 (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003, 1208, and
1240); Migrant Protection Protocols, INA § 235(b)(2)(C) (Jan. 29, 2019); Safe Third Country
interim final rule 8 C.F.R. 208 (2019); Memorandum from Jefferson B. Sessions, Attorney Gen.,
U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Fed. Prosecutors Along the Southwest Border, Zero-Tolerance for Offenses
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (Apr. 6, 2018), https-/www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1049751/
download [https-//perma.cc/AF4U-2CNT];WILLIAMA.KANDEL,CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45266,
TH ETRUMP ADMINISTRATION'S "ZERO TOLERANCE"IMM IGRATION EN FORCEMENT POLICY (2019),

httpsJ/fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R45266.pdf [https://perma.cc/8SAE-4X7Z. See also U.S. DEP'T OF
HOMELAND SEC., POLICY GUIDANCE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MIGRANT PROTECTION

PROTOCOLS (2018); Presidential Memorandum on Additional Measures to Enhance Border Security
and Restore Integrity to Our Immigration System, 2019 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (Apr. 29,

2019).
8. Immigration and Nationality Act § 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (b)(4)(A) (2012) ("the alien
shall have the privilege of being represented, at no expense to the Government, by counsel of the
alien's choosing who is authorized to practice in such proceedings") [hereinafter INA].
9. Notably, this varies greatly by whether or not the Respondent is detained at the time he
seeks fear-based relief. For example, nationwide in 2019, 38,652 of those seeking asylum were
represented by counsel (out of 45,322). But looking at detained cases-rather than a combination
of detained and non-detained cases-reveals a grimmer portrait. For example, nearly half of the
more than 6,000 asylum cases presented by Respondents at the Krome Detention Center in Miami
were unrepresented. Of those unrepresented, nearly all were denied relief from deportation.
TRACIMMIGRATION, Asylum Decisions, httpsJ/trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/asylum/ (last
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threat, relief under CAT-which, in contrast to a discretionary grant of asylum,
is a mandatory form of relief not so easily undermined-has become increasingly
relevant and important. Indeed, CAT is now more vital than ever as a safeguard
for noncitizens fleeing, or fearing, harm.
But what happens to individuals granted relief under the Convention Against
Torture? This Article explores the precarious legal landscape facing noncitizens,
and the troubling implications for domestic and international law. Part I provides
0
a case study of "Peter"-one noncitizen subject to third country deportation and
one story of a client represented by the author. Part I situates Peter's story in the
larger context of third country removal and relief under CAT. Part II describes the
laws governing cases of noncitizens like Peter. It explains that those granted
protection under CAT face the prospect of a swift, and nearly secret, deportation
to a third country without judicial review. Part III argues that U.S. immigration
courts must interpret our domestic immigration statute in light of international
legal obligations under CAT to ensure that noncitizens are protected from third
country deportation, to a country where they risk harm or torture. To conform
with domestic and international legal obligations, noncitizens must be afforded
notice, the burden of proof must be shifted to the government, and noncitizens
must be granted a full evidentiary hearing before an immigration judge when
DHS seeks to remove a noncitizen to a third country.
An examination of this phenomena is especially important in the current era.
The sitting president, Donald Trump, has called for the mass deportation of
noncitizens: A Presidential tweet, published in July 2019, promised: "[n]ext week
ICE will begin the process of removing the millions of illegal aliens who have
illicitly found their way into the United States. They will be removed as fast as
they come in."" The U.S. government's removal of noncitizens without process
is a real possibility, as many argue that executive power is at its zenith in the
2
context of immigration and the rights of noncitizens. What's more, President
Trump has been consistent in his desire to conduct mass deportations, outside the
purview of the court, proclaiming in a series of tweets in the summer of 2018,

updated June 30, 2019) [https//perma.cc/58PC-GXDQ].
10. A brief note about language. Until April 1997, deportation and exclusion were separate
removal procedures. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
consolidated these procedures. After April 1, 1997, noncitizens in and admitted to the United States
may be subject to removal based on deportability. Now called "removal," this function is managed
by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. In this article, for ease of reading, I tend to use the
more colloquial term "deportation" to cover any removal, by the U.S. Government, of a noncitizen
from the United States.
11. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump),

TWITTER (June

https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1140791400658870274

17, 2019, 6:20 PM),
[https-/perma.cc/FC43-

HDHX].
12. See generally Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581,
(1889); Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Presidentand Immigration Law, 119 YALE
L.J. 458 (2010); see also Jill E. Family, Threatsto the Future of the Immigration Class Action, 27

WASH. U. J.L. & PoL'v 71, 95-101 (2008) (discussing the plenary power doctrine).
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"when somebody comes in, we must immediately, with no Judges or Court Cases,
bring them back from where they came."" This increased appetite for mass
enforcement, detention and deportation has now extended to some of the nation's
most vulnerable, including those with CAT relief. Third country deportation, in
its current form, threatens to remove exceptionally vulnerable noncitizens without
the protection of either judges or courts. But third country deportation flouts both
domestic and international law.
CAT is a 35-year-old watershed international human rights treaty, negotiated
and ratified by the United States, which exists to prevent torture and other acts of
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment across the globe. 4 In
addition to prohibiting states from committing acts of torture and cruel, inhuman,
and degrading treatment, CAT also includes provisions that seek to protect
individuals from being sent to face potential torture in other countries, or in their
home country. For those noncitizens facing deportation, CAT prohibits states
from deporting noncitizens who can demonstrate that it is "more likely than not"
that they will be tortured if removed to their home country.' 5 Where a noncitizen
can demonstrate that it is more likely than not that she will be tortured, her
removal must be withheld or deferred-allowing her to remain, at least for a time,
in the United States.' 6 This avenue of immigration relief is significant for those
who receive it, allowing them to avoid deportation and, in many cases, allowing
for release from immigration detention. But the U.S. regulations also allow the
state an alternative avenue-that when removal is withheld or deferred," the
government may seek removal to a third country." The regulation states:
"Nothing in this section or § 208.17 [deferral of removal] shall prevent the
Service from removing an alien to a third country other than the country to which
removal has been withheld or deferred."' 9 This article asks plainly, what happens
then?
This article builds upon the scholarship of others who have written on the
history and implementation of CAT in the context of U.S. immigration law. That
literature is rich, including incisive critiques of the "specific intent"
requirement-that is, that in order to constitute torture, an act must be
"specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering." 20

13. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 24, 2018 11:02 AM), https-//
twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1010900865602019329?lang-en
[https://perma.cc/2KTTBBPF].
14. United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, openedforsignatureDec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20(1988),
1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Convention Against Torture].

15. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2) (2019).
16. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(4) (2019).
17. See discussion infra Part I (discussing the distinctions between withholding of removal
under CAT and deferral of removal under CAT).

18. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(f) (2019).
19. Id.
20. 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(5) (2019); Mary Holper, Specific Intent and the Purposeful
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Other pieces question the restrictive definition of torture in CAT and make the
argument for so-called "immigration lenity""--a kinder, gentler approach to
application of CAT, so as to ensure that we do not send noncitizens back to places
where they may face harm. Still other articles note the limits of CAT in protecting
specific, and especially vulnerable, noncitizens," and others question the limits
23
on family reunification for recipients of relief under CAT. Finally, scholars have
also investigated the practice of seeking "diplomatic assurances" that a noncitizen
will not be tortured if removed to her home country. Specifically, scholars have
contested the constitutionality of diplomatic assurances in the third country
removal context,24 suggesting that assurances not to torture from a foreign
government still may run afoul of our legal obligations.
Furthermore, this article builds upon the work of other scholars who have
examined the increasingly popular means by which removals are effected outside
26
of the courtroom, namely "shadow removal"" and "speed deportation,"
27
including the increased use of "expedited removal." These are removals from
the United States of noncitizens outside the court system, and without judicial
review-removals that scholars like Mary Holper have likened to an
"unreasonable seizure."" Jill Family has characterized these kinds of shadow or

Narrowing of Victim Protection Under the Convention Against Torture, 88 OR. L. REv. 777, 779
(2009) (arguing that the Board's narrow interpretation of "specific intent" impermissibly shifts the
focus off protecting the victim and onto the alleged torturer's acts); see also Oona A. Hathaway,
Aileen Nowlan & Julia Spiegel, TorturedReasoning: The Intent to Torture UnderInternationaland
Domestic Law, 52 VA. J. INT'L L. 791 (2012).
21. Irene Scharf, Un-Torturing the Definition of Torture and Employing the Rule of

Immigration Lenity, 66 RUTGERs L. REv. 1 (2013).
22. See, e.g., Alyssa Bell & Julie Dona, TorturousIntent: Refoulement of HaitianNationals
Obligations Under the Convention Against Torture, 35 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE
U.S.
and

707 (2011).
23. Lori A. Nessel, Forced to Choose: Torture, Family Reunification, and United States
ImmigrationPolicy, 78 TEMP. L. REv. 897 (2005).
24. See, e.g., Jane C. Kim, Note, Nonrefoulement Under the Convention Against Torture:
How U.S. AllowancesforDiplomaticAssurancesContravene Treaty Obligationsand FederalLaw,
32 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1227 (2007).
25. Jennifer Lee Koh, Removal in the Shadows oflmmigrationCourt, 90 S. CAL. L. REv. 181,
185, 206-07 (2017) (Arguing that "the proliferation of procedures that lead to the formal removal
of noncitizens with no or minimal immigration court involvement warrants a level of attention that
does not yet match the scale of the practice.").
26. Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Rise of Speed Deportationand the Role of Discretion, 5
COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1, 6-7, 22-25 (2014) (discussing expedited removal, reinstatement of removal,
and administrative removal through the lens of prosecutorial discretion).
27. Lindsay M. Harris, Withholding Protection,50 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 1, 5 (2019)
(explaining that CBP increasingly acts to "short-circuit the checks and balances prescribed by U.S.
and international law to protect refugees from being returned to harm" by carrying out expedited
removal and greater numbers).
28. Mary Holper, The UnreasonableSeizures of Shadow Deportations, 86 U. CiN. L. REv.
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speed removals as "diversions" from the typical removal procedure, and critiqued
them through an administrative law lens. 29 Still others have pointed out that such
removals are more likely when low level administrators lacking training and
oversight are asked to carry out complex removal procedures.30 Needless to say,
such removals have dramatically increased in recent years.3 Similarly, third
country deportation-as it currently operates-exists both in the shadows, and at
a pace that often eludes judicial review. Although an initial court hearing is held
in the context of what later becomes a third country deportation-in contrast to
expedited removal, for example-such a hearing is ultimately a charade if DHS
can, at any time thereafter, simply remove a CAT recipient to a third country
absent any formal proceeding. In building upon current scholarship in this arena,
this article extends the conversation, for the first time including a deep
examination of "third country deportations," and situating them amidst the
"bewildering array of . . . fast-track mechanisms"" that have led to a
"deformalization"33 of immigration law, allowing an increasing number of
removals to proceed outside the purview of a courtroom.
This article fills a void in the scholarship by examining what I have termed
"third country deportation"-when the government seeks to remove noncitizens
to a third country without judicial process, though courts previously refused to
remove them to their country of origin34 due to the threat of torture. This article
will illuminate the tensions between domestic procedural rules and our
international legal obligations to understand what happens when DHS attempts
to remove noncitizens to a third country outside of court proceedings. Using Peter
as a case study, this article asks, what obligations does the United States have
under CAT to someone like Peter? What kind of notice must be provided when
the United States intends to remove a noncitizen to a third country? At the same

923, 924 (2018).
29. See Jill E. Family, A Broader View of the Immigration Adjudication Problem, 23 GEo.
IMMIGR. L.J. 595 (2009).
30. See Amanda Frost, Learningfrom Our Mistakes: Using Immigration Enforcement Errors

to Guide Reform, 92 DENV. U. L. REv. 769, 769 (2015).
31.

ALISON SISKIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43892, ALIEN REMOVALS AND RETURNS:

OVERVIEW AND TRENDS 8 (2015) ("In recent years, these streamlined removal processes [including
expedited removal, reinstatement, and administrative removal] have accounted for a higher
percentage of total removals than standard removals, and are responsible for most of the growth
in the overall number of removals.").
32.

DANIEL KANSTROOM, AFTERMATH: DEPORTATION

LAW AND THE NEW AMERICAN

DIASPORA 52, 65-67 (2012) (describing reinstatement of removal, expedited removal,
administrative removal, stipulated removal, and voluntary departure as examples of the deformalization of immigration law) https-/www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/

9780199742721.001.0001/acprof-9780199742721-chapter-3 [https//perma.cc/K2DV-MSK4].
33. Id. (emphasis in original).
34. It's worth noting that the country of origin, citizenship, and nationality may be different.
In "Peter's" case, Sudan is his country of origin, citizenship, and nationality-though that will not
always be the case.

340

INDIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:333

time, what obligations might domestic courts have, and what, if any, domestic
procedural rules might require reopening in this case to allow Peter, or someone
like him, to defend against deportation to a third country? This article situates
itself at the intersections of domestic and international law, asking what our
obligations are under each, as well as when and whether they are in conflict. The
United States' ability to potentially flout both domestic legal requirements and
international obligations when it comes to protecting actual and potential victims
of torture, like Peter, matters-it threatens to expand the means by which
noncitizens are removed without a court proceeding in instances where the stakes
are the highest-where possible torture is at stake. Ultimately, in making
recommendations, this article also builds upon the work of scholars who have
used international law and legal standards to inform their interpretation of the
U.S. Constitution and relevant U.S. statutes and regulations in the immigration
context, as well as those who have recognized the limits of such application."
I. THIRD COUNTRY DEPORTATION IN CONTEXT

This Part begins by returning briefly to "Peter," to illustrate both the legal and
humanitarian impact of third country deportation on vulnerable noncitizens. This
Part asks, who are those subject to third country deportation, and what law or
laws protect them?
A. Peter'sStory
In Sudan in the 1990s, Peter's family was Christian, active in the Christian
aid community, and opposed to the repressive government of President Omar alBashir. At the age of seven, Peter's father was shot and killed by government
military officials. Shortly thereafter, his mother was kidnapped, detained and
beaten, also by Sudanese military officials who returned her to her home "unable
to walk." The family-Peter, his mother and his two younger siblings-fled
Sudan to the neighboring country of Egypt. Once there, Peter and his family were
designated as refugees, but life remained difficult. On one occasion, Peter
witnessed a horrific stampede by police in a refugee camp that left many around
him injured or dead. Finally, when Peter was 15 years old, he and his family were

35. See Denise Gilman, Realizing Liberty: The Use of InternationalHuman Rights Law to
Realign Immigration Detention in the United States, 36 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 243, 287 (2013);
Melissa A. Waters, Creeping Monism: The Judicial Trend Toward Interpretive Incorporationof

Human Rights Treaties, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 628, 700-05 (2007); David Cole, The Idea of
Humanity: Human Rights and Immigrants'Rights, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 627, 645-49
(2006); Harold Koh, InternationalLaw as Partof Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 43, 56 (2004); see
also Sarah Cleveland, OurInternationalConstitution, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 118 (2006) ("[T]he
fact that a treaty is not self-executing does not qualify the United States' international obligations
under the treaty."); Gerald L. Neuman, The Uses of International Law in Constitutional
Interpretation,98 AM. J. INT'L L. 82, 88 (2004) (noting that international human rights norms and
decisions "cannot control constitutional interpretation, but they may inform it" and may prove
helpful in requiring reexamination of long-standing doctrinal structures).

2020]

THIRD COUNTRY DEPORTATION

341

brought to the United States.
But in the United States, Peter struggled. Violent nightmares left him reliving
the traumas of his childhood. He found himself on edge, hyper vigilant, and
mistrustful of those around him. To quiet these symptoms and to help himself
sleep, Peter turned to alcohol in high school. At 19 years old, while drunk, Peter
was arrested for theft and assault. He pled guilty and was detained by
Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") and placed in immigration
removal proceedings.
In removal proceedings, Peter, through counsel, sought several defenses to
deportation. And, after nearly one year in detention, he was ultimately granted
relief under CAT, when the Immigration Judge found that he would face torture
by the Sudanese government if removed there. His removal to Sudan was thus
"deferred" and his removal proceedings were closed.
Just prior to his final removal hearing, in July of 2011, South Sudan was
granted independence and became a separate, sovereign nation. Peter was born
in Khartoum, and a citizen of Sudan. South Sudan was neither suggested nor
designated as a country of removal during his removal proceedings. Nevertheless,
in dicta, the Immigration judge offered that he was "not sanguine" 36 that Peter
would even be safe in South Sudan. As such, the issue was not explored further.
Peter, relieved, was released from ICE custody and returned to his life and
home in New England. Peter still struggled with substance abuse and had trouble
with the law. But with Peter now the eldest of eight siblings, his family relied on
him to help care for his diabetic mother and to help with cooking and cleaning
around the house. In his mid-20s, Peter met Emily, a U.S. Citizen, and together
they had two sons. While Emily worked, Peter relished being a stay at home
father, caring for their two young boys.
One evening, as Peter was taking out the trash at his home, four ICE officers
surrounded him. It had been nearly seven years since he was granted relief under
CAT, and he didn't expect to encounter ICE again. Surprised, he asked why he
was being detained. "We're sending you to South Sudan, now!" several of them
retorted, laughing. After nearly 18 months in a New England Jail, Peter was
finally released, and reunited with his two young children. This article is, in part,
the story of how that happened-and why he should never have been at risk of
removal to South Sudan in the first place.
B. The Convention againstTorture (CAT) Article 3.1 and U.S. Implementation
Under international and domestic law, a person may not be removed to a
country where she will be tortured. CAT was adopted "to make more effective the
struggle against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment throughout the world." 37 CAT is multifaceted, including requirements

36. Copy of Immigration Judge's decision on file with author. (Mar. 13, 2012).
37. Convention Against Torture, supra note 14, at ANNEX. See generally Pnina Baruh
Sharvit, The Definition of Torture in the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman and DegradingTreatmentor Punishment, 23 IsR. Y.B. HUnM. RTS. 147, 147 (1994)
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that participating states work to prevent torture within their own borders, and to
take other measures to protect actual or potential victims of torture. Most relevant
to this article, CAT includes Article 3.1 which reads, "[n]o State Party shall expel,
return ("refouler") or extradite a person to another State where there are
substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected
to torture."38

Movement toward this international treaty began in 1974, when the United
Nations (UN) General Assembly directed the Fifth United Nations Congress "to
give urgent attention to the question of the development of an international code
of ethics for police and related law enforcement agencies" and "to include, in the
elaboration of the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, rules
for the protection of all persons subjected to any form of detention or
imprisonment against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment."39 Thereafter, CAT was drafted by several bodies working within the
UN framework and adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 10,
1984.40
In 1988, the United States signed CAT, and following the advice and consent
of the Senate, revisions were made and the Senate adopted CAT in August of
1990.4' The United States ultimately ratified CAT in 1994.42 Still, advocates made
little use of CAT until 1999, largely because, until then, the domestic legal
43
machinery for implementing CAT had not yet been established.
In 1990, the Senate held that CAT was not self-executing; thus, Congress
needed to pass implementing legislation. Finally, in 1998, Congress implemented
CAT through the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998
("FARRA"),44 though many have argued that given the content and text of the
implementing statute, the implementing statute "arguably falls short" of meeting

("The prohibition of torture ... is one of the most basic principles of human rights, and is compared
to the most fundamental rights, such as the right to life or the prohibition of slavery."); CHARLES
GORDON, STANLEY MAILMAN, STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR & RONALD Y. WADA, IMMIGRATION LAW

§ 33.10

(rev. ed. 2014).
Torture, supra note 14, at art. 3.1 (emphasis in original).
Against
38. Convention

AND PROCEDURE

& HANS DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST
CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN
THE
ON
HANDBOOK
A
TORTURE:
39.

J. HERMAN BURGERS

OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT 14-15 (1988) (quoting a draft resolution of the 1974

UN General Assembly) (emphasis in original).
40. Id.
41.

S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND

OTHERCRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT ORPUNISHMENT,

S. EXEC. REP.NO. 101-30,

at 9 (1990).
42. See U.N. Doc. 571 Leg/SER.E/13.IV.9 (1995).
43.

STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW

AND POLICY 1120 (6th ed. 2015).
44. Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, Div. G.

Title XXII, § 2242, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-822 (1998) [hereinafter FARRA].
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our domestic obligations under CAT. 45
CAT was adopted to ensure that no individual is subjected to torture in their
own country or returned to a country where they will be subject to torture.
Because of the universal condemnation of torture, there are no exceptions to this
prohibition, not even for individuals with serious criminal convictions. 46 That is,
relief under CAT is mandatory. 47 By contrast, many, if not most, other forms of
immigration relief, including asylum, 48 cancellation of removal,4 9 voluntary
departure50 and various waivers," are discretionary, and decision making is
guided by case law rather than by statute or regulation.52 Because the United
States may not return an individual to a country where they may be tortured, all
noncitizens facing removal from the United States are eligible to apply for
deferral of removal under CAT, and if the statutory criteria are satisfied, CAT
relief will be granted.53 Moreover, because CAT is mandatory, it is generally
understood that the attendant procedural protections will be greater.54 As this
article explains, that does not hold true in the context of third country deportation.
The Committee Against Torture, the monitoring body created by the parties

45. LEGOMSKY &. RODRIGUEZ, supranote 43, at 1123.

46. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17 (2019); Aksoy v. Turkey, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 553, 585 (1996)
("Article 3 makes no provision for exceptions and no derogation from it is permissible ... even in
the event of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation."); see also, e.g., Moncrieffe v.
Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 187 n.1 (2013) (noting that "[a] conviction of an aggravated felony has no
effect on CAT eligibility.").
47. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17(a) (2019) ("An alien who: has been ordered removed; has been found
under § 1208.16(cX3) to be entitled to protection under the Convention Against Torture; and is
subject to the provisions for mandatory denial of withholding of removal under §1208.16(d)(2)
org(d)(3), shall be granted deferral of removal to the country where he or she is more likely than
not to be tortured.").
48. 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2012), Immigration and Nationality Act § 208 [hereinafter INA].

49. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2012), INA § 240A.
50. 8 U.S.C. § 1229c (2012), INA § 240B.
51. 8 U.S.C.§ 1182 (Supp. V 2017), INA§ 212.
52. For example, by case law, when deciding whether or not to grant adjustment of status,
"factors relevant to determining whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted include,
but are not limited to: the existence of family ties in the United States; the length of the
respondent's residence in the United States; the hardship of traveling abroad; and the respondent's
immigration history, including any preconceived intent to immigrate at the time of entering as a
nonimmigrant. A respondent's criminal history is an additional consideration." Matter of Hashmi,
24 I. & N. Dec. 785, 793 (BIA 2009) (citing Matter of Bias, 15 1. & N. Dec. 626 (BIA 1974; A.G.

1976)); Abu-Khaliel v. Gonzales, 436 F.3d 627, 634 (6th Cir. 2006); see also Oluyemi v. INS, 902
F.2d 1032, 1033-34 (1st Cir. 1990) (stating that an alien must establish that adjustment is warranted
as a matter of discretion); Matter of Arai, 13 I. & N. Dec. 494 (BIA 1970).

53. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16-18, 1208.16-18 (2019).
54. See, e.g., Gerald L. Neuman, DiscretionaryDeportation,20 GEO.

IMM

IGR. L.J. 611, 621

(2006) ("[T]he discretionary character of a decision may be used to justify less formal procedures
and to avoid judicial review.").
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to the Convention to monitor interpretation and compliance by member states, has
interpreted the obligations of Article 3 of CAT as placing the burden of proof on
the noncitizen applicant to demonstrate that there are substantial grounds to
believe that she would be subjected to torture if removed to the proposed
country." Further, the Committee has interpreted the non-removal provisions of
Article 3 to refer to both direct and indirect removal to a state where the
individual concerned would likely be tortured, meaning that a state cannot
remove a person to a third country when it knows he would subsequently be
56
removed to a country where he would likely face torture.
There are two distinct types of relief under CAT: (1) withholding of removal
under CAT;5 7 and (2) deferral of removal under CAT." While both prohibit the
removal of a noncitizen to a country where she would face torture, the latter is
reserved for those noncitizens who are ineligible for withholding as the result of,
59
for example, criminal or prosecutor bars. Moreover, the ways in which each
form of relief may be terminated by the Department of Homeland Security are
distinct. Noncitizens granted withholding of removal under CAT may have such
relief terminated if DHS establishes that the noncitizen is no longer likely to be
tortured in the country of removal.60 By contrast, deferral under CAT may, in
addition, be terminated at any time based on "diplomatic assurances forwarded
by the Secretary of State pursuant to the procedures in § 208.18(c)," assuring the
Department that the noncitizen will not, in fact, face torture in the country of
removal." In a sense then, both forms of relief under CAT are "temporary."
While the exact number of CAT cases that have been reopened and/or terminated
is not known, it is contemplated by the statute, which outlines a two-step process
for doing so,63 and some case law, and anecdotal evidence, suggests it is a

55. U. N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Committee Against Torture,
Implementation ofArticle 3 of the Convention in the Context ofArticle 22, CAT GeneralComment
No. 1, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/53/44, annex IX (Nov. 21, 1997) [hereinafter CAT General Comment No.
1] (The Committee's interpretation as to the scope of Article 3 was made in the context of CAT
Article 22, which permits the Committee, upon recognition by a state party, to receive
communications from individuals subject to the state's jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a
CAT violation by a state party.).

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at ¶ 2.
8 C.F.R. § 208.16 (2019).
8 C.F.R. § 208.17 (2019).
8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16(d)(2), 208.17 (2019).
8 C.F.R. § 208.17(d) (2019) (outlining the process for the termination of deferral of

removal).

61. 8 C.F.R. § 208.17(f) (2019).
62. Regulations Concerning the Convention Against Torture, 64 Fed. Reg. 8,478, 8,480-82

(Feb. 19, 1999) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 3, 103, 208, 235, 238, 240, 241, 253, and 507) (noting
that both deferral of removal and withholding of removal can be terminated, though the process

differs for each).
63. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17(d)(1)-(4) (2019).
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periodic occurrence. 64 Similarly, while statistics are inconsistently reported, cases
involving diplomatic assurances appear to be few. 65
To establish a claim for CAT relief, the noncitizen must show that it is "more
likely than not" that she will be tortured if removed and that the torture will occur
at the hands of the government, or with the acquiescence of the government, in
the country of removal.66 If the noncitizen makes this showing, then relief is
mandatory and the individual cannot be removed to a country where she faces
such likelihood of torture.67 Torture is defined as:
[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental,
is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from
him or her or a third person information or a confession, punishing him
or her for an act he or she or a third person has committed or is suspected
of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or her or a third
person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind ...
.6
In order to constitute torture, mental pain or suffering must be prolonged
mental harm caused by or resulting from one of a list of enumerated grounds. 69
Moreover, "torture does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent
in, or incidental to lawful sanctions."" For the purposes of CAT however, this

64. See, e.g., Matter of C-C-I-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 376 (BIA 2014).
65. Diplomatic Assurances and Rendition to Torture: The Perspective of the State
Department's Legal Advisor, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Orgs., Human Rights, and

Oversight of the H. Comm. On Foreign Affairs, 1 10th Cong. 11-12 (2008) (statement of John B.
Bellinger, III, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State) (Bellinger is inconsistent in his testimony, saying
that there are a "handful of cases where diplomatic assurances have been sought" in the
immigration removal context, and later that there are "less than 20 cases overall since CAT was
ratified," while in yet another instance he refers to a "dozen" cases in immigration or extradition
where diplomatic assurances have been sought); see Karake v. United States Dept. of Homeland
Sec., 672 F. Supp. 2d 49 (D.D.C. 2009); Khouzam v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 549 F.3d

235 (3d Cir. 2008); Yusupov v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 518 F.3d 185 (3d Cir. 2008);
Soliman v. United States ex. rel. INS, 296 F.3d 1237 (11th Cir. 2002).
66. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.17(a), 1208.19(a)(1) (2019); see Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 536
n.6 (2009).
67. 8 C.F.R. § 208.17(a) (explaining that a noncitizen who satisfies the CAT standard "shall
be granted deferral of removal").(emphasis added).

68. 8 C.F.R §§ 208.18(a)(1), 1208.18(a)(1) (2019).
69. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.18(a)(4), 1208.18(a)(4) (2019) (stating that "[i]n order to constitute
torture, mental pain or suffering must be prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from: (i)
The intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering; (ii) The
administration or application, or threatened administration or application, of mind altering
substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality; (iii)
The threat of imminent death; or (iv) The threat that another person will imminently be subjected
to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration or application of mind altering
substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the sense or personality.").

70. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.18(a)(3),

1208.18(a)(3) (2019).
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definition excludes any "sanctions that defeat the object and purpose of the
71
Convention Against Torture to prohibit torture."
Since the adoption of CAT, U.S. courts have struggled to give meaning to the
text of the treaty and its implementing statute and regulations. A lack of clarity
on third country removal is just one ambiguity in treaty interpretation. For
example, in defining what it means to be "acting in an official capacity," the
Board of Immigration Appeals has looked to those acting "under color of law"
in civil rights cases and held that a CAT claim will only arise in those cases in
which a "public official" or person "acting in an official capacity" acquiesces to
the torture.72 Courts have differed on what this means, for instance, when a public
official goes rogue or commits acts of torture while off duty, finding in some
74
instances that this may," or may not, satisfy the regulation. Relatedly, courts
75
have held that physical custody and control are not required.
With regard to designation of the country to which removal under CAT will
be deferred or withheld, CAT bars return only to that country specifically
76
designated in the removal proceeding. And an immigration judge may not grant
CAT relief until the noncitizen has first received a final order of removal under
the INA." Thus, the immigration judge must initially determine that the
noncitizen is subject to removal and that no other form of immigration relief is
available. If the noncitizen is ordered removed, the immigration judge may at that
78
point grant CAT relief, which effectively stays the removal order. However, a
grant of CAT relief does not eliminate the order of removal, which remains in
place. 79
Nevertheless, once CAT has been granted, the regulations permit the
Government to remove a noncitizen to a third country. The regulations state: "(f)
Removal to third country. Nothing in this section or § 208.17 shall prevent the
Service from removing an alien to a third country other than the country to which
80
removal has been withheld or deferred."
The regulations do not outline any procedure or protocol for carrying out this
option.8' Moreover, a defense to third country removal at the time of the initial
hearing could not logistically be raised before the proceedings are
concluded-that is, in practice, an order of removal will be issued, CAT relief

8 C.F.R. §§ 208.18(a)(3), 1208.18(a)(3) (2019).
In re Y-L-, 23 1. & N. Dec. 270, 285 (AG. 2002).
See, e.g., Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 361-63 (9th Cir. 2017).
See, e.g., Costa v. Holder, 733 F.3d 13, 17-18 (1st Cir. 2013).
See, e.g., Reyes-Reyes v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 782, 788 (9th Cir. 2004).
Silva-Pereira v. Lynch, 827 F.3d 1176, 1191-92 (9th Cir. 2016).
8 C.F.R. § 208.17(a) (2019) (providing for grant of CAT deferral only if the applicant
ordered removed"); see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.17(b)(1) (stating that an applicant will be
been
"has
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

notified of her grant of CAT deferral after an Immigration Judge orders the applicant's removal).

78.
79.
80.
81.

8 C.F.R. § 208.17(a) (2019).
See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16(f), 208.17(b)(1), 208.17(d) (2019).
8 C.F.R. § 208.16(f).
Cf 8 C.F.R. § 208.17(d).
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will be granted, and the record will then be closed. In practice, DHS does not seek
third country removal until after the close of proceedings and thus any evidence
offered by the noncitizen during the hearing-about a hypothetical, as yet
unknown, removal to a yet-to-be-named country-would almost certainly be
characterized as irrelevant and, therefore, inadmissible, as evidence in a court
proceeding.82
Just as the regulation fails to outline a procedure or protocol for carrying out
third country deportation, the regulation fails to comply with our CAT obligations
in other ways, too. For example, Deborah Anker has argued that the "purposeful
intent" required by the U.S. definition of torture fails to comply and is
inconsistent with the purpose of CAT.83 John Parry goes further, exploring the
ways in which U.S. implementation of CAT violates the principles of the
Convention, while at the same time enabling the U.S. to engage in torture and to
send noncitizens back to countries where they face the risk of torture. For
instance, Parry explains that the U.S. interpretation of CAT does not protect
persons against "cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment" (CIDT),
which Parry argues is inconsistent with our obligations under CAT.84
II. THE PROCESS OF THIRD COUNTRY DEPORTATION

A. Limited Statutory andRegulatory Guidance
This Part will identify which avenues are currently available to challenge
third country deportation and what protections may currently exist to protect a
noncitizens' rights. The removal statute sets out the process by which DHS may
select a country of removal for a noncitizen facing deportation, including that
DHS may remove the noncitizen to the country from which the noncitizen was
admitted, born, or the port from which she came." Where none of those options

82. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1240.7(a), 1240.46(b) (providing that an Immigration Judge may only
"receive in evidence any oral or written statement that is material and relevant to any issue in the
case previously made by the respondent or any other person during any investigation, examination,
hearing, or trial"); see also Andriasian v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 180 F.3d 1033, 1041
(9th Cir. 1999) (in which the Respondent was not informed of the newly designated country of
removal until the end of his asylum hearing, after the close of evidence. The Court held that this
"violated a basic tenet of constitutional due process: that individuals whose rights are being
determined are entitled to notice of the issues to be adjudicated, so that they will have the
opportunity to prepare and present relevant arguments and evidence.").
83. Deborah E. Anker, Understanding "Suffering", Yet Misconstruing Intentionality: U.S.

Compliance and Non-compliance with the Convention against Torture, REFLAw (Aug. 6, 2017),
http-//www.reflaw.org/understanding-suffering-yet-misconstruing-intentionality-u-s-complianceand-non-compliance-with-the-convention-against-torture/ [https://perma.cc/9KAP-P8RR].
84. John T. Parry, TortureNation, Torture Law, 97 GEO. L.J. 1001, 1049-50 (2009).

85. 8 U.S.C. §1231(b)(2)(E) (2012) ("[T]he [Secretary] shall remove the alien to any of the
following countries: (i) The country from which the alien was admitted to the United States. (ii)
The country in which is located the foreign port from which the alien left for the United States ... (iv)
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are possible or practical, a third country whose government will accept the
noncitizen may be chosen." Very little has been written about so-called "third
88
country deportation." 7 Though the issue has arisen in several circuit court cases,
and though the Supreme Court has confronted similar issues in designation of a
country in removal proceedings-namely, removal to a country that lacks a
89
receiving or accepting government -neither scholarship on the topic nor the
legislative history of 8 C.F.R. 208.16(f) shed significant light on how removal to
a third country not named in the removal proceeding should be carried out, or
what protections must be necessary in order for the process to accord with CAT.
The regulations governing deferral of removal under CAT provide, "[t]he
immigration judge shall also inform the alien that removal has been deferred only
to the country in which it has been determined that the alien is likely to be
tortured, and that the alien may be removed at any time to another country where
90
he or she is not likely to be tortured." As well, the legislation and regulations
implementing CAT require that noncitizens be afforded the opportunity to apply
for relief under the Convention with respect to any country to which they may be
removed.91 Taken together, this language all but requires a hearing-at which

The country in which the alien was born ...

(vii) If impracticable, inadvisable, or impossible to

remove the alien to each country described in a previous clause of this subparagraph, another
country whose government will accept the alien into that country."); see also Jennifer E. Richter,
Return to Sender: Supreme Court Authorizes Removal ofAliens Without PriorConsentfrom the
Destination Country in Jama v. Ice, 57 MERCER L. REv. 953, 956-57 (2006) ("If, after this
designation, the alien cannot be removed, then the alien must either be detained or released in
accordance with other statutory provisions.").

86. But see Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enf't, 543 U.S. 335, 335 (2005) (8 U.S.C. §
1231 (b)(2)(E)(iv) (permitting a noncitizen to be removed to a country without the advance consent
of that country's government).
87. Not to be confused with the safe third country agreement or firm resettlement in a third

country, each of which are distinct aspects of US immigration law. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(A)
(2019), INA § 208(a)(2)(A) (safe third country); 8 U.S.C. § I158(aX2)(A) (2012), INA §

VFN5]; 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(6) (safe third country regulations).
88. See Wani Site v. Holder, 656 F.3d 590 (7th Cir. 2011); Kuhai v. Immigration

&

208(b)(2)(A)(vi) (firm resettlement); Agreement between the Government of the United States and
the Government of Canada for Cooperation in the Examination of Refugee Status Claims from
Nationals of Third Countries, Can.-U.S., Dec. 5, 2002, Treaties and Other International Acts Series
No. 04-1229 (safe third country agreement with Canada, signed Dec. 5, 2002, effective Dec. 29,
2004), https-/2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/178473.pdf [https-//permacc/RE3U-

&

Naturalization Serv., 199 F.3d 909, 913 (7th Cir. 1999); Andriasian v. Immigration
Naturalization Serv., 180 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir. 1999); Kossov v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv.,

132 F.3d 405 (7th Cir. 1998); Ademi v. INS, 31 F.3d 517 (7th Cir. 1994).
89. Jama, 543 U.S. at 335 (§ 1231(b)(2)(E)(iv) permits a noncitizen to be removed to a
country without the advance consent of that country's government.).
90. 8 C.F.R § 208.17(b)(2) (2019) (emphasis added).
91. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(4) (2019); FARRA, Pub. L. No. 105-277, Div. G. Title XXII,
§ 2242(a), 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-822 (1998).
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time the applicant can learn which country has been designated for removal and,
if they wish, seek protection. This is intuitive-an applicant cannot seek
protection from harm or torture without knowing to where she will be removed.
Neither an immigration judge nor anyone else can determine whether the
applicant is more likely than not to be harmed or tortured in the country of
removal absent designation of such country and a hearing at which testimony and
evidence are received.
Moreover, though the Convention was ratified on October 21, 1994, it was
subject to certain limitations, including a declaration that CAT Articles 1 through
16 were not self-executing, and therefore required domestic implementing
legislation.9 2 The Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998
("FARRA") made clear that, henceforth, the United States would not expel,
extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary removal of any person to a country
where there are substantial grounds for believing that the person would be in
danger of being subjected to torture. 93
What does this mean in the context of third country removal? FARRA
Section 2242(d) provides for judicial review of all CAT claims arising in the
removal context. But such review would be almost meaningless if the reviewing
court could not address the risk of torture in the destination country. Similarly,
the notice accompanying the regulations presupposes that the opportunity to
apply for protection will be country-specific, as it contemplates that a noncitizen
"will have the opportunity to apply for protection as appropriate from any of the
countries that are identified as potential countries of removal."9 4
B. When the Courts Weigh In
Courts have considered whether, and when, noncitizens must be notified of
removal to a third country and the process by which they may be permitted to
present a request for relief from removal to that third country. For example, in
Andriasian v. INS, an immigration judge told a pro se asylum-seeker at an initial
hearing that Azerbaijan was one of the countries designated for removal. 95 At the
hearing itself, however, the judge added Armenia to the list of possible countries
of deportation. 96 The Ninth Circuit held that the "last minute designation" of a
new country of removal was impermissible. 97 Indeed, such designation foreclosed
the opportunity to present evidence in support of Andriasian's claim for relief and

92. See generally Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification, S. ExEC. RPT. 101-30
(1990) [hereinafter Sen. Resolution].

93. FARRA, Pub. L. No. 105-277, Div. G. Title XXII, § 2242(a), 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-822
(1998).
94. See Execution of Removal Orders; Countries to Which Aliens May Be Removed, 70 FR

661, 671 (Jan. 5, 2005) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 241, 1240-1241) (Supplementary Information,
clarifying without amending language used in the final rule).
95. Andriasian v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 180 F.3d at 1038 (9th Cir. 1999).

96. Id. at 1039.
97. Id. at 1041.
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violated a basic tenet of due process-namely, that "individuals whose rights are
being determined are entitled to notice of the issues to be adjudicated, so that they
will have the opportunity to prepare and present relevant arguments and

evidence.""
In the Seventh Circuit, the Kossov family faced similar due process
violations. The Kossovs, a husband and wife who arrived in the United States on
tourist visas from what was then the Soviet Union, filed for asylum and were
placed in removal proceedings. 99 Their asylum application, with Mrs. Kossov as
the lead, ultimately claimed fear of persecution in Latvia on account of her
religion and ethnicity.1 00 During the hearing, at which the Kossovs appeared pro
se, Mrs. Kossov argued that she was in fact stateless following the dissolution of
the Soviet Union, at which time the government asked the Immigration Judge to
01
The Immigration Judge
designate Russia as the country of removal.
10 2
And yet, the bulk of the testimony concerned persecution in the
complied.
country of Latvia-not Russia. The Seventh Circuit, referring to a "fundamental
failure of due process," held that an immigration judge must affirmatively notify
pro se asylum applicants that removal to each specific country designated is a
possibility, and must then advise them of the availability of relief as to each
one.' 3
Over a decade later, in the case of Sudanese national Zakaria Bullen Wani
4
Mr. Wani Site had been ordered
Site, the Seventh Circuit went further.'
stage, the government, for the
review
for
removed to Sudan when, at the petition
to South Sudan, instead.' 5
Site
first time, asserted that it may remove Mr. Wani
The Seventh Circuit rejected that assertion, holding that the Government may not
initiate removal proceedings to remove a noncitizen to South Sudan at such a late
stage in the proceedings, even if South Sudan did not exist at the time of the
06
noncitizen's initial removal proceedings.'

98. Id.; see also Castillo-Villagra v. INS, 972 F.2d 1017, 1029 (9th Cir. 1992) (taking
administrative notice of changed country conditions without providing opportunity to rebut violates
due process but overruled on other grounds).

99.
100.
101.
102.

Kossov v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 132 F.3d 405 at 406 (7th Cir. 1998).
Id.
Id. at 407.
Id.

103. See Kossov, 132 F.3d at 408 (holding that because "the U never informed the Kossovs,
who at the time were without counsel, that they had the right to ... introduce evidence specifically
directed against deportability to Russia," they could not be deported to Russia); see also Kuhai, 199
F.3d at 913 (reversing deportation order where BIA had sua sponte altered the country of
deportation from Uzbekistan to Ukraine, thereby denying petitioner the opportunity to apply for
asylum and withholding relief with respect to that country); 8 C.F.R. § 240.49(c)(2) (2001)
(requiring that U provide notification of right to apply for asylum or withholding of deportation to
the country of deportation and forms for such application).

104. Wani Site, 656 F.3d at 595.
105. Id. at 594.
106. See id. at 595 (remanding to the immigration judge to determine whether the designated
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Importantly though, the cases of Andriasian, Kossov, and Wani Site involve
respondents in active removal proceedings, prior to the issuing of a final order of
removal. In these cases, there are eyes on the Respondent; that is, their cases are
"open," and they have the procedural ability to appeal adverse decisions,
shedding light on substantive and procedural due process violations, as well as
other violations of domestic and international law. Conversely, the reality faced
by respondents like Peter is bleak-with no judicial review, they languish in the
shadows, often in immigration detention, with very limited recourse or protection
available to them. In this way, in cases like Peter's, whether intentionally or not,
the government is doing a sort of "end run" around the law-waiting to raise the
prospect of third country removal until the noncitizen has no process by which
to contest it.
C. Existing Law and Remedies: Limited Recoursefor Respondents

"

What mechanisms are currently available in the case of third country
deportation to-at least hypothetically-protect the rights of noncitizens? This
section explores the potential avenues for protection, including motions to reopen
and habeas relief, available to noncitizens facing the prospect of third country
removal. More concretely, the foregoing examines the limitations on those
protections.
The protections available to Respondents subject to third country deportation
are scant. In fact, the only available mechanism provided by the regulations to
apply for protection with respect to a third country appears to be reopening the
proceedings. Reopening the case allows the immigration judge to hear new facts
and evidence in a proceeding. Motions to reopen and to reconsider ("MTRs")
provide an important means of correcting errors in removal proceedings, and the
only available means of taking into account changed circumstances or new legal
precedent.' 0 7 While motions to reconsider address legal or factual errors,10
motions to reopen address new facts that were previously unavailable.' 09 Indeed,

country of removal could be changed from Sudan to South Sudan).

107. Rachel E. Rosenbloom, Remediesfor the Wrongly Deported: Territoriality,Finality, and
the Significance of Departure,33 U. HAw. L. REv. 139, 153 (2010); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(c)(6)-(7)
(2012); U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGRATION REv., IMMIGRATION CT. PRAC.

102-107 (2018).
108. In re Ramos, 23 1. & N. Dec. 336, 338 (BIA 2002) (ruling that a motion to reconsider
asks that a decision be reexamined "in light of additional legal arguments, a change of law, or
perhaps an argument or aspect of the case that was overlooked earlier," including errors of law or
MANUAL

fact in the previous order); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C) (2012); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1)
(2019); INA § 240(c)(6)(C).
109. A motion to reopen is based on "facts or evidence not available at the time of the original
decision." Patel v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 610, 612 (7th Cir. 2004). It must be supported by affidavits
or other evidence, and must establish that the evidence is material, was unavailable at the time of
the original hearing, and could not have been discovered or presented at the original hearing. See

8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7) (2012); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(l) (2019); INA § 240(c)(7); see also Kaur v.
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the Supreme Court has noted that motions to reopen are "an important safeguard
intended to ensure ,a proper and lawful disposition of immigration
proceedings.""' This part will focus on motions to reopen, rather than motions
to reconsider, as they are most likely to be relevant in the third country removal
context-that is, the possibility of removal to a third country, and torture or
persecution in that country, is a new, previously unavailable fact which requires,
I argue, notice and a new hearing.
By statute, a motion to reopen "shall state the new facts that will be proven
at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted, and shall be supported by
affidavits or other evidentiary material."' A motion to reopen presented to the
immigration judge or Board of Immigration Appeals must show that the new,
proposed evidence is: (1) material; (2) was unavailable at the time of the original
hearing; and (3) could not have been discovered or presented at the original
hearing." 2
Responding to the concerns of courts and Congress that motions to reopen
3
could lead to abuse and delay," regulations were promulgated imposing both
4
time and number limits on such motions," limits that were later incorporated into
5
the statute." Today, following the issuance of a final order of removal,

BIA, 413 F.3d 232, 234 (2d Cir. 2005).
110. Kucana v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 827, 834 (2010) (quoting Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1, 18
(2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

111. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(B) (2012), INA § 240(c)(7)(B).
112. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).
113. See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 107 (1988) ("There is
a strong public interest in bringing litigation to a close as promptly as is consistent with the interest
in giving the adversaries a fair opportunity to develop and present their respective cases.");

Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323 (1992) ("This is especially true
&

in a deportation proceeding, where, as a general matter, every delay works to the advantage of the
deportable alien who wishes merely to remain in the United States.") (citing Immigration

Naturalization Serv. v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. 444, 450 (1985)). In the Immigration Act of 1990,

&

Congress directed the Attorney General to "issue regulations with respect to .. . the period of time
in which motions to reopen and to reconsider may be offered in deportation proceedings, which
regulations [should] include a limitation on the number of such motions that may be filed and a
maximum time period for the filing of such motions." Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101649, § 545(d)(1), 104 Stat. 4978, 5066 (1990). Congress issued this directive in order to "reduce
or eliminate ... abuses" of regulations that, at that time, permitted respondents to file an unlimited
number of motions to reopen without any limitations period. See Stone v. Immigration
Naturalization Serv., 514 U.S. 386, 400 (1995). There is evidence that the agency did not share this

concern. See Zhang v. Holder, 617 F.3d 650, 657 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Dada v. Mukasey, 554
U.S. 1, 13 (2008)) ("Although the Attorney General expressed doubt about the need to impose such
limitations because there was 'little evidence of abuse,' she ultimately promulgated regulations that,
subject to certain exceptions, permitted an alien to 'file one motion to reopen within 90 days."').
114. See Stone, 514 U.S. at 400 (discussing congressional directive to agency to promulgate
regulations).

115. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(B) (2012),

INA § 240(c)(6)(B)

(motion to reconsider); 8
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'

noncitizen respondents have the legal right to file one motion to reopen within
ninety days of the immigration judge's decision."' Nonetheless, there are some
available exceptions created by statute or regulation,"' as well as sua sponte
authority available to immigration judges and the BIA to reopen cases in which
they have made a decision "at any time."" 8 Among the exceptions are those
pertaining to fear-based protection based on changed country conditions arising
in the country to which removal has been ordered-insuch cases, no restrictions
apply."' In addition, some courts of appeal have held that the deadline for filing
a motion to reopen may be tolled. 20 Importantly, the Government's ability to file
a motion to reopen is not subject to any of the time and numerical limitations.' 2
Peter's case illustrates both the value of, and limitations on, a motion to
reopen in the third country deportation setting. Following his arrest by ICE nearly
seven years after his original grant of relief under CAT, Peter was arrested and
detained in immigration custody in New England. Through counsel, Peter filed
an emergency motion to reopen his removal proceedings, citing new facts and
providing new evidence that he would be tortured or killed if removed to South
Sudan. Peter argued that this evidence was material and previously
unavailable-after all, South Sudan had only recently become a sovereign
nation.' Moreover, conditions in South Sudan had deteriorated significantly
during the past several years, and there was ample evidence that those like Peter
are targeted by the South Sudanese government for harm, torture and death. 2 1
Finally, Peter could not have filed this motion at an earlier date as he had no way

U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i) (2012), INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(i) (motion to reopen).
116. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i), INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(i) (establishing ninety-day deadline for
motion to reopen).

117. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii) (2012), INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 U.S.C. §
1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv) (2012), INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(iv).
- 118. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(a), 1003.23(b)(1) (2019). Sua sponte reopening is subject to
certain limitations regarding judicial review and application of 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(d) and
1003.23(b)(1) that are generally not applicable to statutory motions.

119. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(i) (2019); 8 C.F.R. §
1003.2(c)(3)(ii) (2019).
120. See e.g., Kuusk v. Holder, 732 F.3d 302, 305 (4th Cir. 2013) (collecting equitable tolling
cases).

121. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1) (2019).
122. South Sudan became a sovereign nation when it declared its independence on July 9,
2011. See Jeffrey Gettleman, After Years of Struggle, South Sudan Becomes a New Nation, N.Y.
TIMES
(July 9, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/10/world/afhca/l0sudan.html
[https //perma.cc/B94S-K3UR].
123. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, SOUTH SUDAN 2017 HUM. RTS. REPORT 2 (2018); Soldiers
Assume We Are Rebels: Escalating Violence in South Sudan's Equatorias,HuM. RTS. WATCH
(Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/08/01/soldiers-assume-we-are-rebels/escalatingviolence-and-abuses-south-sudans [https://perma.cc/S7EE-UDKH]; South Sudan: Army Abuses
Spread West, HUM. RTs. WATCH (Mar. 8, 2016), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/03/06/southsudan-army-abuses-spread-west# [https://perma.cc/8QGV-UE63].
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of knowing that DHS would take the step of attempting to remove him, without
a hearing, to a newly created country where he faces likely torture and death.
Though the new evidence that Peter sought to present was material,
previously unavailable, and could not have been discovered or presented at the
original hearing,' 24 the Immigration Judge denied his request to reopen his
removal proceedings.'
Notwithstanding an appeal on the denial of his motion to reopen, what other
options are available for a noncitizen Respondent in this situation? A second
possibility would be a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Historically, habeas corpus has been used to challenge the legality of
deportation. 126 Federal District Courts have jurisdiction to hear habeas claims by
127
As
noncitizens contesting the lawfulness of their immigration detention.
of
violations
allege
might
described below, a habeas claim in this context
the
and/or
regulations,
applicable
FARRA, due process, the INA and
Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"), and seek, as relief, that the court enjoin
the government from removing the noncitizen to the proposed third country until
12
she has an opportunity to apply for a defense to deportation. ' A habeas in this
context might also seek release from custody and/or an individualized custody
determination to give the noncitizen an opportunity to request release from

124. 8 C.F.R § 1003.2(c)(1) (2019).
125. That decision was subsequently appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals and is
now pending. See copy of decision on file with author. (Feb. 12, 2019).

126. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Mensevich v. Tod, 264 U.S. 134, 135 (1924) (exercising
habeas jurisdiction over challenge to country selected for deportation during the period when
applicable habeas review was reduced to the constitutional minimum); United States er rel. Di

Felice v. Shaughnessy, 114 F. Supp. 791, 793 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (recognizing that "[i]t has long been
held" that noncitizen could challenge the lawfulness of the place of deportation on habeas); United

States ex rel. Chen Ping Zee v. Shaughnessy, 107 F. Supp. 607, 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (same).
127. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Immigration & Customs Enf't Div. of Dep't of Homeland Sec., 510

F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 516 (2003)); Federal Courts still
have jurisdiction over habeas claims notwithstanding certain "jurisdiction-stripping provisions"

present in the REAL ID Act of 2005 and set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1252. Indeed, even if the
jurisdiction-stripping provisions applied here, to foreclose habeas relief for a noncitizen Respondent
facing potential torture or death in the country of removal would present a violation of the

Suspension Clause. Compere v. Nielsen, 358 F. Supp. 3d 170, 179 (D. N.H. 2019) (quoting
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 792 (2008)); see also Hussein v. Brackett, No. 18-cv-273-JL,
2018 WL 2248513 *1 at *4-5 (D. N.H. May 16, 2018); see also Devitri v. Cronen, 290 F. Supp.
3d 86, 93 (D. Mass. 2017) ("Devitri 1") (concluding that "[i]f the jurisdictional bar in 8 U.S.C. §
1252(g) prevented the Court from giving Petitioners an opportunity to raise their claims [for postorder of removal Motions to Reopen based on changed circumstances] through fair and effective
administrative procedures, the statute would violate the Suspension Clause as applied"). But see

Hamama v. Adducci, 912 F.3d 869, 876-77 (6th Cir. 2018) (holding that the district court lacked
jurisdiction to entertain the Suspension Clause stay of deportation habeas claim, and even if the

district court had jurisdiction, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) provided an adequate substitute for habeas).
128. See, e.g., Compere, 358 F. Supp. 3d at 176.
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custody from an immigration or federal court judge.1 29
Ultimately, both motions to reopen and habeas are inadequate and ineffective
solutions. To begin, both of these mechanisms place the burden unfairly on the
Respondent. Not only may the government reopen a case at any time, subject
neither to restrictions on time nor number of motions,"' but in this case, to place
the burden of reopening on the Respondent violates both domestic procedural
rules and our international obligations.
And this burden, it should be noted, is heavy. Noncitizens in removal
proceedings are not entitled to counsel, except at their own expense.' 3 The
government, then, has no obligation to provide an attorney for those noncitizens
unable to afford one.' 32 As a result, for noncitizens who are detained during their
removal proceedings, the average rate of representation during 2016-2017 was
just about 30 percent.' 33 Unfortunately for pro se respondents seeking relief from
removal, immigration law is notoriously complex-alternately described as
"labyrinthine, " "hyper-technical," and known to cause "waste, delay, and
confusion for the Government and petitioners alike."'34 Add to this calculus that
noncitizens are likely to be attempting to navigate this complicated body of law
in a language they do not understand, and in a judicial system where they are
dramatically out-resourced by well-equipped government prosecutors.'" On top

129. Id.
130. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1) (2019).
131. INA § 240; 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2012) ("[T]he alien shall have the privilege of
being represented, at no expense to the Government, by counsel of the alien's choosing who is
authorized to practice in such proceedings.").
132. The only exception is in the case of noncitizens found to be mentally incompetent. See
Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, 767 F. Supp. 2d 1034 (C.D. Cal 2010); see also U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION REVIEW, PHASE I OF PLAN TO PROVIDE ENHANCED
PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS

TO UNREPRESENTED

DETAINED RESPONDENTS

WITH

MENTAL

DISORDERS (2013); Sarah Sherman-Stokes, No Restoration, No Rehabilitation:Shadow Detention
of Mentally Incompetent Noncitizens, 62 VILL. L. REV. 787 (2017); Sarah Sherman-Stokes,

Sufficiently Safeguarded?: Competency Evaluations of Mentally Ill Respondents in Removal
Proceedings,67 HASTINGS L.J. 1023 (2016).
133. Who is Represented in Immigration Court?, TRACIMMIGRATION (Oct. 16, 2017),
https-/trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/485/ [https-/perma.cc/26ML-NQYB].

134. Drax v. Reno, 338 F.3d 98, 99 (2d Cir. 2003) (describing "the labyrinthine character of
modern immigration law" as "a maze of hyper-technical statutes and regulations that engender
waste, delay, and confusion for the Government and petitioners alike"); see also Filja v. Gonzales,
447 F.3d 241, 253 (3d Cir. 2006) (characterizing the immigration regulations as "labyrinthine");
Baltazar-Alcazar v. INS, 386 F.3d 940, 948 (9th Cir. 2004) ("It is no wonder we have observed
'[w]ith only a small degree of hyperbole, the immigration laws have been termed second only to
the Internal Revenue Code in complexity. A lawyer is often the only person who could thread the
labyrinth."') (quoting Castro-O'Ryan v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 847 F.2d 1307, 1312

(9th Cir. 1987)).
135. See generally Jason A. Cade, The Challenge of Seeing Justice Done in Removal
Proceedings, 89 TUL. L. REV. 1 (2014) (highlighting the inequalities faced by noncitizens in
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of that, many noncitizen Respondents will litigate their cases while recovering
36
from significant trauma and persecution, further challenges to their success.1 It
is no surprise then that a national study of access to counsel in immigration court
found that the odds were "fifteen times greater that immigrants with
representation, as compared to those without, sought relief and five-and-a-half
times greater that they obtained relief from removal." 37 For detained noncitizens,
the statistics are devastating. The study found that "detained immigrants with
counsel obtained a successful outcome (i.e., case termination or relief) in 21% of
cases, ten-and-a-half times greater than the 2% rate for their pro se
counterparts. "38
Considering the inequity between noncitizen Respondents and government
prosecutors, and the high stakes involved in potentially removing a noncitizen to
a country where she faces harm, this article starts from the premise that "thirdcountry removal would require additional proceedings" and that, at the very least,
"DHS would be required to give petitioners notice and the opportunity for a
hearing."1 39
And finally, a note about discretion and finality. Even if the above weren't
inadequate and ineffective solutions, there is a serious question as to whether,
even if legally justified, third country deportations are a worthwhile expenditure
of the government's limited resources. Moreover, taking into account factors like
family or community ties to the United States, victim status, and other
humanitarian considerations, though outside the scope of this paper, there is a
140
strong argument to be made that prosecutorial discretion is warranted here.
That is, even if third country deportation were legally permissible, that in many
cases, on balance, these noncitizens-often victims or would-be victims of torture
and persecution-are entitled to discretion. Moreover, in light of the
government's limited resources to pursue deportation efforts-and the already
41
is
enormous backlog of cases present in the immigration courts' -finality
adjudicative
accompanied
desirable. Indeed, finality has historically

immigration proceedings due to DHS attorneys' almost unchecked level of discretion on how to
conduct the proceedings and little to no disclosure requirements).
136. See, e.g., Jennifer Umberg, Trauma and the Paradoxof Asylum Seekers' Credibility 11
(Jan. 10, 2018) (published M.A. Thesis, Columbia University), https-//academiccommons.

columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/D8DZ1RWJ/download

[https://permacc/S66J-A6MY]

("Studies

estimate that PTSD among refugees range from 30-80 percent").
137. Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study ofAccess to Counsel in Immigration

Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 9 (2015).
138. Id.
139. Diaz v. Hott, 297 F. Supp. 3d 618,625 (E.D. Va. 2018) (cf Kossov, 132 F.3d at 408-09).
140. For a further discussion of the role of prosecutorial discretion in the immigration removal
context, see Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, BEYOND DEPORTATION: THE ROLE OF PROSECUTORIAL
DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION CASES (2015); Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The History of
ProsecutorialDiscretion in Immigration Law, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 1285 (2015).

141. Immigration Court Backlog Tool, TRACIMMIGRATION, https-//trac.syr.edu/phptools/
immigration/courtbacklog/ (last updated June 30, 2019) [httpsJ/permacc/3KNZ-YGDF].
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relief-providing some semblance of permanence in status. 4 2 Granting relief to
a noncitizen only to leave him in limbo, and with the possibility of deportation
to a third, not-yet-named country in the future, is antithetical to the principles of
finality, discretion, and administrative efficiency.
III. OUR DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATIONS REQUIRE MORE

This article contends that we have specific requirements domestically, as well
as unique requirements as a state party to CAT, to ensure that there are procedural
protections for any noncitizen who may be removed to countries where they face
torture. To begin with, on a domestic level, we have substantive norms that
require certain procedural protections to ensure "fundamental fairness" in
removal proceedings."' These include both Due Process requirements and
protections under the APA. Similarly, our obligations under CAT and the
FARRA statute-which implemented our treaty obligations under the non-selfexecuting CAT-all require that someone in Peter's situation be given an
affirmative opportunity by an immigration judge to present evidence in support
of a claim for relief prior to removal to a third country. In the event that there is
any question as to the force of our domestic procedural rules, they must be
interpreted in a way that conforms to our international obligations. In short, even
if our domestic law is ambiguous, we must read it not to undermine our clear
international obligations under CAT. 4
A. Due Process and the APA

Though not subject to the full range of constitutional protections, immigration
proceedings "must conform to the Fifth Amendment's requirement of due
process."' Due process requires that the government be constrained before it

142. Jason A. Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, 84

FORDHAM

L. REV. 661, 668 (2015).

143. See, e.g., Biwot v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 2005) ("The right to counsel
in immigration proceedings is rooted in the Due Process Clause."); Dakane v. United States Att'y

Gen., 399 F.3d 1269, 1273 (11th Cir. 2005) ("It is well established in this Circuit that an alien in
civil deportation proceedings . . . has the constitutional right under the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause ...
to a fundamentally fair hearing."); Borges v. Gonzales, 402 F.3d 398, 408 (3d
Cir. 2005) ("[T]he Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation
proceedings." (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993)(intemal quotations omitted));
Rosales v. Bureau of Immigration & Customs Enft, 426 F.3d 733, 736 (5th Cir. 2005) ("[D]ue
process requires that [deportation] hearings be fundamentally fair ... "); Brown v. Ashcroft, 360
F.3d 346, 350 (2d Cir. 2004) ("The right ... under the Fifth Amendment to due process of law in
deportation proceedings is well established.").
144. Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64 (1804) ("[A]n act of Congress ought never to
be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.").
145. Salgado-Diaz v. Gonzales, 395 F.3d 1158, 1162 (9th Cir. 2005) (as amended); see also
Gonzaga-Ortega v. Holder, 736 F.3d 795, 804 (9th Cir. 2013) (as amended); Vilchez v. Holder, 682

F.3d 1195, 1199 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. Reyes-Bonilla, 671 F.3d 1036, 1045 (9th Cir.
2012); Lacsina Pangilinan v. Holder, 568 F.3d 708, 709 (9th Cir. 2009) (order); see also Gutierrez
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acts in a way that deprives individuals of life or liberty interests protected under
4
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.' ' Of course, removal without
a formal hearing is tolerated in certain contexts-Jill Family has categorized
myriad ways in which noncitizens are "diverted" from the immigration
adjudication process, including explicit and implicit waivers, in which certain
visa holders, for example, waive their rights to access trial-level administrative
adjudication, administrative review, and judicial review in exchange for the
benefits of a visa.' 47 Similarly, in the context of expedited removal, DHS can, and
48
does, remove certain noncitizens at ports of entry without a hearing.' One
notable exception in both of these "diversionary" situations is in the case of a
noncitizen who fears a threat to her life-by claiming fear, at least hypothetically,
noncitizens can get into court, and in front of an immigration judge, in order to
make a claim for relief. Though even this supposed failsafe has been challenged
as inadequate protection, in which poorly trained officers "act as investigator,
judge, and jury, with the immigration courts completely uninvolved in the
removability determination."' 49 Outside of these contexts, at a minimum,
removing a noncitizen from the United States without the procedural safeguards
of a formal hearing may result in a due process violation."'

v. Holder, 662 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 2011) ("A full and fair hearing is one of the due process
rights afforded to aliens in deportation proceedings .... A court will grant a petition on due process
grounds only if the proceeding was so fundamentally unfair that the alien was prevented from
reasonably presenting his case.") (citations and quotation marks omitted).

146. Colmenar v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 210 F.3d 967, 971 (9th Cir. 2000)
("[A]n alien who faces deportation is entitled to a full and fair hearing of his claims and a
reasonable opportunity to present evidence on his behalf.").
147. Family, supra note 29, at 612.

148. Id. at 624; OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION

STATISTICS, U.S. DEPTf

OF HOMELAND SEC.,Annual

Report, Immigration Enforcement Actions: 2016, at 8 (2017), https-/www.dhs.gov/sites/default/
files/publications/Enforcement_Actions_2016.pdf [https//perma.cc/VS94-FN23] (reporting that
of 340,056 removals in 2016, 141,518 were expedited removal orders and 143,003 were
reinstatements, totaling 284,521, or 83.6 percent). At the time of this writing, the United States
Government has initiated yet another way to remove noncitizens at ports of entry, summarily
expelling noncitizens at the border in the name of public health. Order Suspending Introduction of
Persons From a Country Where a Communicable Disease Exists, 85 Fed. Reg. 16567 (proposed
Mar. 24, 2020) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R 71), https//www.cdc.gov/quarantine/order-suspendingintroduction-certain-persons.html.
149. JenniferLee Koh, Removalin the Shadows oflmmigration Court, 90 S. CAL. L. REv. 181,

193 (2017).
150. See Salgado-Diaz, 395 F.3d at 1162-63 ("[F]ailing to afford petitioner an evidentiary
hearing on his serious allegations of having been unlawfully stopped and expelled from the United
States, aborting his pending immigration proceedings and the relief available to him at the time,
violated his right to due process of law."); United States v. Raya-Vaca, 771 F.3d 1195, 1204 (9th
Cir. 2014) (failure to inform petitioner of the charge against him and to provide him with the
opportunity to review the sworn statement constituted a violation of petitioner's due process rights)
("Due process always requires, at a minimum, notice and an opportunity to respond.").
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And in a case where DHS seeks to remove a noncitizen to a third country
where she may be tortured, this article argues that the noncitizen must have a
chance to present her claim for relief, including a hearing and the opportunity to
present evidence on her behalf, before she is removed from the United States to
that country."'5 For Respondents in this particular procedural posture, the Court
has previously granted them relief-the Court has affirmatively recognized their
unique vulnerability as survivors of torture, or as someone likely to be tortured
in the future-and accorded them protection under CAT as a result.' Such
persons warrant extra protections. Further still, for those who are detained and
facing removal to a third country, there are potential violations of the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment, as it regards the noncitizen's liberty interests and
freedom from imprisonment.' Specifically, due process requires that, in these
cases, deprivation of the noncitizen's liberty be narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling government interest. '" Where, instead, a noncitizen is detained,
pending removal to a country that has not been formally designated, continued
detention is not in service of any permissible government objective and is,
therefore, unlawful.'" In short, due process is violated when a noncitizen is
summarily removed to a third country absent an opportunity to be heard.''
In addition, removal to a third country of a noncitizen absent notice and a
hearing violates the APA. Though an exhaustive analysis is outside the scope of
this article, the APA may be a mechanism to challenge third country deportation.
The APA prohibits agency action that is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law."' 7 In conformity with
this standard, when reviewing agency actions, courts "must assess, among other

151. "A full and fair hearing is one of the due process rights afforded to aliens in deportation
proceedings.. . . A court will grant a petition on due process grounds only if the proceeding was
so fundamentally unfair that the alien was prevented from reasonably presenting his case."
Gutierrez v. Holder, 662 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations and quotation marks omitted);
see also Cano-Merida v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 311 F.3d 960, 964 (9th Cir. 2002);
Colmenar v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 210 F.3d 967, 971 (9th Cir. 2000) ("[A]n alien
who faces deportation is entitled to a full and fair hearing of his claims and a reasonable
opportunity to present evidence on his behalf.").

152. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2) (2019).
153. "[N]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law." U.S. Const. amend. V; Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) ("Freedom from
imprisonment ... lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.").
154. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695-696 (discussing how courts' interference with "'sensitive'
repatriation negotiations" does not entitle the government to heightened deference).

155. Id. at 695-96, 699.
156. See, e.g., Andriasian,180 F.3d at 1041 (9th Cir. 1999) (failing to provide notice to a
noncitizen of the country to which he would be removed violates due process); see also CastilloVillagra v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 972 F.2d 1017, 1029 (9th Cir. 1992) (taking
administrative notice of changed country conditions without providing opportunity to rebut violates
due process) (overruled on other grounds).

157. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(B).
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matters, whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors
58
This assessment
and whether there has been a clear error of judgment."'
"involves examining the reasons for agency decisions-or, as the case may be,
the absence of such reasons."' 59 Thus, courts have the important role of "ensuring
that agencies have engaged in reasoned decision making."'16 In these cases,
agency action may be arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion, when taken
6
without providing notice or a hearing to the noncitizen.' ' In accordance with the
APA and the requirements of due process, a noncitizen facing removal to a third
country is entitled to both notice that a third country has been designated, and a
hearing at which she can present evidence that she would not be safe there.
B. CAT and FARRA
Pursuant to FARRA and the regulations, and to ensure compliance with
international treaties to which it is a signatory, the Government is prohibited from
removing any noncitizen to a country where she will more likely than not face
torture.16 Article 3.1 of CAT is clear, "[n]o State Party shall expel, return
("refouler") or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial
16 3
grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture."
There is no provision or exception for a "third country" or alternate country, that
may be designated following the close of proceedings and without additional
judicial review.
As mentioned, CAT is definitively interpreted through the opinions of the
Committee Against Torture, a panel of independent experts charged with
monitoring implementation and state party compliance with CAT.' 64 And, in fact,
a review of the cases from the Committee reveals not a single case in which a
country has asserted authority to remove someone to a country without providing
her the opportunity to apply for relief under CAT specifically with respect to that
country.' 65 This kind of affirmation by omission suggests that nations that commit

158. Judalang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 53 (2011) (internal quotations omitted).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(4) (2012).
162. See FARRA, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 2242, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-822 (1998); 8 C.F.R.
§§ 208.16, 208.17 (2019).
163. Convention Against Torture, supra note 14, at art. 3.1.
164. U.N. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUM. RTs. (OHCHR), Committee Against
Torture, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CAT/Pages/CATIndex.aspx
[https-/perma.cc/3JML-QWAH] (last visited Jan. 10, 2020).

165. See UNIV. OF MINN. HuM. RTs. LIBR., Decisions and Views of the Committee Against
Torture Under Article 22 of the Convention, http-/hrlibrary.umn.edu/cat/decisions/catdecisions.html [https-/perma.cc/5JDL-HHQP] (last visited Feb. 18, 2019); see also OHCHR,
Jurisprudence (CAT and nonrefoulement), http://juris.ohchr.org/en/search/results/3?
(last
[https//perma.cc/3H2Y-6V2L]
typeOfDecisionFilte=0&countyFilter=0&treatyFilter-0
visited Feb. 18, 2019) (reporting several dozen cases, none of which involve a state asserting that
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themselves to the Convention Against Torture, like the United States, do not
remove noncitizens to countries without giving them the opportunity to apply for
country-specific relief.
C. Ambiguity Requires That We Interpret Statutes in Light of
Our InternationalLegal Obligations
In immigration litigation, international human rights law has been invoked,
"primarily as a guide to the interpretation of immigration statutes and of
constitutional protections for foreign nationals."'66 So too here, we can-and
should-examine the immigration statute and regulations through the lens of
international human rights law to ensure that the rights of noncitizens like Peter
are adequately protected.
Indeed, courts have been somewhat hospitable to arguments that international
human rights norms are an appropriate guide for statutory or constitutional
interpretation in the immigration context.' 67 For example, in 1987, in interpreting
the "withholding of removal" provision in the Immigration and Nationality Act,

the Supreme Court relied on our obligations under the Refugee Convention. 6 8

Thereafter, in Ma v. Reno, the Ninth Circuit invoked international law limits on
arbitrary detention to prohibit the indefmite detention of immigrants following
a final order of removal.' 9 Indeed, following Chief Justice John Marshall's
famous proclamation in The CharmingBetsy,"' we now know that "absent a clear
conflict, courts should interpret federal statutes to conform to international law
obligations. To do so, the courts must by necessity take account of and interpret
applicable international law norms.""'
CAT provides that, "[n]o exceptional circumstances whatsoever . .. may be
invoked as a justification of torture."'" With this in mind, we can turn to
interpreting the statute and regulations to be in conformity with this obligation.

it can deport someone without allowing them to apply for relief specific to the country of
deportation).
166. Cole, supra note 35, at 644.
167. Cole, supra note 35, at 645. But see Susan Akram, The Past as Present, Unlearned
Lessons andthe (Non-) Utility ofInternationalLaw, 44 N.C. J. INT' L L. 389,417 (2019) (noting that
there are "significant barriers to the use of international legal strategies in refugee and immigrationrelated cases").
168. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987). But see
Akram, supra note 167, at 407 (Despite a favorable outcome for the Respondent noncitizen in this
case, Akram notes that the court's legal reasoning was "deeply flawed," and moved "U.S. refugee
jurisprudence farther away from international practice.").

169. Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815, 818-20, 829-31 (9th Cir. 2000), vacated and remanded on
other grounds, 257 F.3d 1095 (2001); see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2002).
170.
never to
171.
172.

Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64 at 118 (1804) ("[A]n act of Congress ought
be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains[.]").
Cole, supra note 35, at 646.
Convention Against Torture, supra note 14, at art. 2.
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Invoking international law in this way-indirectly, as an aid to statutory
construction-obviates many of the concerns raised when advocates pursue more
direct reliance on international human rights principles, including the problem of
non-self-executing treaties and "generating common law through customary
international law."'
And, precisely because the section of the regulations that contemplates third
country deportation outlines no process for doing so,' we are well served to use
international human rights law here as a "guide." Similarly, the Board of
Immigration Appeals has recognized that additional procedural protections are
warranted when imposing a bar on asylum relief. For example, in determining
whether or not to allow a duress exception to the "persecutor bar"-which bars
applicants from receiving asylum if they are found to have persecuted others-the
Board considered both our domestic and international legal obligations, as well
as the potential resultant harm in foreclosing a duress exception.' 7 That is,
because the stakes are so high when it comes to the possibility of
persecution-that is to say nothing of torture-additional care must be given so
as not to "shut off a life line in a compelling case" for relief in the refugee
context.' 7 6 So, too, here we must be mindful of the high stakes involved-that,
absent additional procedure, a noncitizen may be removed to a country in which
she will be tortured. And, she risks being removed there without due process or
judicial review.
Finally, the risk that third country removal becomes simply another
mechanism for "speed" or "shadow" deportation is real and threatens the due
process rights of noncitizens and the integrity and fairness of the legal system, as
well as our obligations under domestic and international law. What remedies
exist, then, for a proceeding in which DHS seeks to remove a-noncitizen to a third
country?
Other scholars to confront so-called "speed" or "shadow" deportations have
posited various suggestions for reform. Jennifer Lee Koh has argued that shadow
deportations must necessarily be part of a larger conversation around immigration
court and removal proceedings reform; ' and that shadow deportations are just
one way in which the executive branch is inhibiting noncitizens' access to

173. Cole, supra note 35, at 646 (explaining that, for example, statutory construction
arguments "avoid the problem of non-self-executing treaties" as well as the dangers articulated in
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) about "generating common law through customary
international law").

174. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(f) (2019).
175. Matter ofNegusie, 27 I. &N. Dec. 347 (BIA 2018).
176. Id. at 361; see also Charles Shane Ellison, Defending Refugees: A Casefor Protective
ProceduralSafeguards in the PersecutorBar Analysis, 33 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 213, 238 (2019)
("First, the proposed procedural safeguards must be crafted in a manner that recognizes the severe
consequences that adhere in application of the bar in the worst-case-scenario.").
177. Koh, supra note 149, at 231 ("This Article advocates incorporating summary removals
and the peripheries of immigration court more comprehensively into conversations over
immigration adjudication.").
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immigration courts altogether.' 7 8 Situating her analysis within a Mathews
framework, Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia has argued that DHS should "provide a
fair day in court for those who qualify for relief from removal or whom the
administration has determined warrant protection from removal based on
individual equities," including eligibility for relief from removal, longtime
residents, survivors of violence, and individuals with serious medical or mental
health conditions.' 9 Whereas Lindsay Harris, in the context of increasing
expedited removals occurring in the shadows, advocates the use of body-worn
cameras by CBP officers to ensure that refugees are not illegally returned to harm
through expedited removal.'8 0
Recipients of CAT are, by definition, vulnerable-an immigration judge has
previously determined that they have been and/or will more than likely be victims
of torture-the most severe form of harm short of death. It is in this vein that this
article argues for more robust and automatic protections for this vulnerable group
that do not depend on individual equities, and go further than the exceptions set
forth by statute and regulation.' 8 ' For this group of especially vulnerable
noncitizens, this article argues for (1) adequate notice, (2) burden shifting, and (3)
an evidentiary hearing before removal to a third country can be carried out.
1. Adequate Notice.-Peter's notice of removal to South Sudan consisted of
a verbal taunt by immigration enforcement officers at the time of his
arrest-"We're sending you to South Sudan, now!"' 82-followed by one letter,
summarily informing him that "[his] case is under current review by South Sudan
for the issuance of a travel document."'"8 This notice was informal, at best.'"
More importantly, missing from this notice was any process by which Peter could
contest the basis of his removal or mount a defense to deportation based on his
fear of return to South Sudan. In fact, during his arrest by ICE officers outside his
family home in December of 2018, Peter was told to sign the papers ICE handed
him "or else" he would be "prosecuted and sent to federal prison."'"8 Nervous,
and unsure what he was signing, Peter ultimately relented. Though he was also
terrified of being removed to South Sudan, a country in which he has never

178. Jennifer L. Koh, Barricadingthe Immigration Courts, 69 DUKE L.J.
(2020).

ONLINE

48-74

179. Wadhia, supra note 26, at 25-26.
180. Harris, supra note 27, at 5.

181. See e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv) (2012),
1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii) (2012), INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(ii).
182.
183.
184.
than the

INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(iv); 8 U.S.C. §

Telephone conversation with "Peter" (Dec. 6, 2018) (notes on file with author).
"Notice of Revocation of Release" (Dec. 4, 2018) (copy of notice on file with author).
In this instance, a lack of adequate notice and process seems the proverbial feature, rather
bug. But, perhaps, it is the latter-yet another example of the challenges of automated
government decisions that create a crisis for the administrative state. See e.g., Danielle Keats
Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REv. 1249, 1281 (2008) (explaining how
automated government decisions "often deprive individuals of their liberty and property, triggering
the safeguards of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.").
185. Telephone conversation with "Peter" (Dec. 6, 2018) (notes on file with author).
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18
stepped foot and where he believes he will be tortured or killed.
Due Process requires the government to provide adequate notice before it acts
in any way that deprives a person-regardless of immigration status-of life or
liberty interests protected under the Fifth Amendment. Typically, when the
government wishes to remove a noncitizen, they must first issue a "Notice to
7
Appear" ("NTA") and file it with the immigration court.'" The NTA must
contain the nature of the proceedings, the legal authority under which proceedings
are conducted, the factual allegations and identification of the provisions of the
88
INA alleged to have been violated, as well as the noncitizens' rights.' In the case
of third country deportation, this article proposes similar notice in writing that
clearly outlines (1) the nature of proceedings, (2) the charges against the
noncitizen, and (3) the process by which a noncitizen can contest third-country
removal in the ways described below.
2. Burden Shifting.-To read our domestic procedural rules in conformity
with our obligations under CAT requires that we shift the burden to DHS to
reopen an immigration removal proceeding in the case of third country
deportation.
The statute and regulations related to motions to reopen set clear time and
number limits on such motions-time and number limits to which DHS is not
subject.' 9 And while fear-based protection, such as CAT, is not subject to these
limitations, it is only fear-based protection related to country conditions in the
90
country to which removal has been ordered.' Where, as here, a new third
country is sought by DHS-a country to which the Respondent has not
previously been ordered removed-this supposed protective failsafe is moot.
These limits on the Respondent's ability to motion to reopen her case -- coupled
with the extraordinary burdens of appearing, often pro se, in immigration
court-require nothing less than burden shifting in the third country removal

context.

Placing the burden on DHS in removal proceedings is not unprecedented. For
example, for persons who are charged with not being admitted or paroled into the
United States, the burden of proof is now statutory. If the person is not an
9
applicant for admission, DHS must first establish "alienage."' ' Similarly, DHS
bears the burden of establishing deportability by evidence which is "clear,
unequivocal, and convincing."' 92 Where DHS seeks to rescind a grant of lawful

186. Id.
187. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(aX) (2012), INA § 239(a).
188. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1) (2012), INA § 239(a).
189. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(a); 1003.23(b)(1) (2019). Sua sponte reopening is subject to
certain limitations regarding judicial review and application of 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(d) and
1003.23(b)(1) that are generally not applicable to statutory motions.

190. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(2) (2012); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(i); 8 C.F.R. §
1003.2(c)(3)(ii) (emphasis added).
191. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(c) (2019).
192. Woodby v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 385 U.S. 276, 277 (1966). Though once
alienage is established, the burden is on the respondent to show the time, place, and manner of
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permanent resident status, it again bears the burden and must provide evidence
that is "clear, unequivocal, and convincing."' 93 Most recently, the U.S District
Court for the District of New Hampshire held that, in certain bond proceedings,
placing the burden on noncitizen detainees is, in fact, unconstitutional.' 4 Other
courts have gone further, recognizing that "due process places a heightened
burden of proof on the State in civil proceedings in which the individual interests
at stake are both particularly important and more substantial than loss of
money"' 95 and that "civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant
deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection."' 96 These courts and
others have held that due process requires the government to bear the burden of
justifying detention by clear and convincing evidence.' 97
Similarly, keeping the burden on vulnerable, and likely unrepresented,
Respondents to claim relief in the case of removal to a third country cannot be
squared with our legal obligations. If the burden is not shifted to DHS, then the
onus remains on noncitizens to articulate their fear in legally cognizable terms.
Currently, for noncitizens who fear return, they may be able to seek protection
following a "credible" or "reasonable" fear interview (CFI, or RFI, respectively),
depending on the particular procedural posture of the case.' 9' All first-time border
crossers must be asked a series of four fear-related questions, by regulation, in an
effort to protect against removal of a noncitizen to a country where she fears
harm, but the same does not apply to someone previously granted relief who DHS
intends to remove to a third country.' 9 Typically, for any noncitizen who

entry. 8 U.S.C.§ 1361 (2012), INA § 291.
193. Matter of Vilanova-Gonzalez, 13

I.

& N. Dec. 399, 399 (BIA 1969); Waziri v.

Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 392 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1968).
194. See Hernandez-Lara v. Immigration & Customs Enf't, No. 19-cv-394-LM, 2019 WL
3340697, at *4-7 (D.N.H. July 25, 2019) ("[T]he court holds that, in a § 1226(a) bond hearing, due
process requires that the government bear the burden of justifying detention by clear and
convincing evidence.").
195. Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 363 (1996) (internal quotation marks and ellipses
omitted).
196. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979).
197. See Aparicio-Larin v. Barr, No. 6:19-cv-06293-MAT, 2019 WL 3252915, at *6

(W.D.N.Y. July 20, 2019); Nzemba v. Barr, No. 6:19-cv-06299-MAT, 2019 WL 3219317, at *1,
*7 (W.D.N.Y. July 17, 2019); Velasco Lopez v. Decker, No. 19-cv-2912, 2019 WL 2655806, at
* 1, *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 15,2019); Linares Martinez v. Decker, No.

18-CV-6527,

2018 WL 5023946,

at *1, *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2018); Darko v. Sessions, 342 F. Supp. 3d 429, 435-36 (S.D.N.Y.
2018).
198. A Primeron Expedited Removal, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL (July 22, 2019),
https://www.american immigrationcouncil.org/research/primer-expedited-removal
[https//perma.cc/P5ZF-8J4P].
199. 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(2) (2019); see Form I-867A & B, Record of Sworn Statement in
Proceedings (requiring officers to ask these four questions: (1) Why did you leave your home
country or country of last residence? (2) Do you have any fear or concern about being returned to
your home country or being removed from the United States? (3) Would you be harmed if you are
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"indicates either an intention to apply for asylum . .. or a fear of persecution,"
200
CBP must refer her to the asylum office for a credible fear interview. If she can
demonstrate a "significant possibility" that she will ultimately establish eligibility
for asylum at a full hearing, she is then "detained for further consideration of
application for asylum."2 0 ' By contrast, a noncitizen who previously had a
removal order and is attempting to reenter the United States and facing
"reinstatement" of her original removal order must pass through a "reasonable"
fear interview.202 In a reasonable-fear interview, the burden is higher-the
noncitizen must establish a "reasonable possibility" that she would be persecuted
on account of one of five protected grounds, or that "she would be tortured in the
country of removal." 203 If she is successful, she is placed in "withholding only"
proceedings where she may make her case for withholding of removal-a lesser
2 04
form of protection-in front of an immigration judge.
But there is significant, and mounting, evidence that CFI/RFI determinations
205
are fraught-often overlooking bona fide claims for relief from removal. As
such, a CFI/RFI or similar process cannot be relied upon as a viable solution for
noncitizens subject to third-country removal. For example, beginning in 2005, at
the request of Congress, the U.S. Commission on International Religious
Freedom ("USCIRF") released three reports detailing the realities of noncitizens
facing removal at the border. 206 The results were alarming. One study revealed
that in 50 percent of interviews, border officials failed to inform noncitizens that
they could seek protection if they feared return.207 What's worse, in 15 percent of
the interviews observed, asylum seekers who expressed fear were deported
without a fear interview. 208 Subsequent studies and reports have confirmed that
immigration officers "seemed singularly focused on removing [noncitizens] from
209
the United States, which impeded their ability to make their fears known."

returned to your home country or country of last residence? (4) Do you have any questions or is
there anything you would like to add?).

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2012), INA § 235(b)(1)(A)(ii).
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v) (2012), INA § 235(b)(1)(B)(v).
8 C.F.R. § 208.31 (2020).
8 C.F.R. § 208.31(c) (2019).
See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2012), INA § 241 (b)(3); see Harris, supra note 27, at 22-37

(providing a more thorough inventory of the differences between these two processes).

205. American Exile: Rapid Deportations That Bypass The Courtroom, AMERICAN CIvIL
LIBERTIES UNION 20-22 (2014), https-/www.aclu.org/report/american-exile-rapid-deportationsbypass-courtroom [https://perma.ce/Y49M-AH2S] [hereinafter ACLU, American Exile Report].

206. Id. at 17-18.
207. See American Exile: Rapid DeportationsThat Bypass The Courtroom, AMERICAN CIvIL
LIBERTIES UNION 43, 99-100 (2014) (explaining the right to apply for asylum and for protection
from persecution under international law and norms), https//www.aclu.org/report/american-exile[hereinafter ACLU,
[https://perma.ccIY49M-AH2S]
rapid-deportations-bypass-courtroom
Report].
Exile
American
208. Id. at 43.
209. "You Don't Have Rights Here": US BorderScreeningAnd Returns OfCentralAmericans

2020]

THIRD COUNTRY DEPORTATION

367

Indeed, what's clear from reports over more than a decade is that immigration
officials routinely provide unreliable accounts of migrants' testimony, summarily
deport asylum-seeking migrants, and create a culture of outright hostility toward
those seeking asylum.21 4
It is in this climate that we must consider the rights of noncitizens who have
been granted a review under CAT and who are, by definition, exceptionally
vulnerable,2 "' having established that it is more likely than not that they will be
tortured in the previously designated country of removal. This article argues that
in lieu of some initial showing by the noncitizen-whether through a CFI/RFI or
other process-the burden should be placed squarely on the shoulders of DHS to
automatically re-open the Respondent's removal proceeding in cases where DHS
wishes to seek removal to a third country.
3. Evidentiary Hearing.-Where DHS bears the burden of reopening the
Respondent's proceedings prior to removal to a third, newly designated country,
there must also be a full evidentiary hearing. Indeed, as cases like Peter's have
percolated up through the circuit courts, it appears that some judges have, at least
indirectly, contemplated an actual, evidentiary hearing when a third-country
designation is sought by DHS. For example, in the case of Mr. Wani Site, the
Seventh Circuit noted that if DHS wanted to remove him to a third country other
than the country designated during the initial removal proceeding, then "the
government still could have initiatedproceedings to remove him to a country
other than Sudan, presumably including South Sudan once diplomatic relations
were established.""'
Pursuant to Section 240 of the INA, a noncitizen shall have a "reasonable
opportunity to examine the evidence against [her], to present evidence on [her]
own behalf, and to cross-examine witnesses presented by the Government."21
Here, too, a Respondent like Peter should have the right to a hearing at which he
can present evidence in support of a request for relief from removal to the newly
designated country. For example, in Peter's case, he was prepared to offer

To Risk Of Serious Harm,

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 6, 8 (2014), http://www.hrw.org/sites/
default/files/reports/us1014_web 0.pdf [httpsJ/perma.cc/A28B-QW87] [hereinafter HRW, You
Don't Have Rights Here Report].
210. See id; see ACLU, American Exile Report, supra note 205; see also Harris, supra note
27, at 77; see also e.g., Sarah Sherman-Stokes, Reparationsfor Central American Refugees, 96
DENy. L. REV. 585 (2019) (documenting legacies of hostility toward asylum claims from Central
Americans in particular).
211. See Amanda C de C Williams & Jannie van der Merwe, The Psychological Impact of
Torture, 7 BR. J. PAIN 2, 101 (2013) (discussing how survivors of torture experience complex
trauma beyond PTSD and have increased susceptibility to chronic pain conditions); see also
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evidence including his own testimony and the expert testimony of a South
Sudanese human rights researcher, as well as numerous governmental and nongovernmental reports corroborating the torture and violence faced by Peter's
ethnic group in South Sudan. However, in the absence of an evidentiary hearing,
such evidence can be neither presented nor fully considered.
This article acknowledges the enormous backlog faced by immigration
21
courts-a record 945,711 pending cases nationwide as of June 2019 --and
recognizes that providing evidentiary hearings to noncitizen detainees like Peter
would add to that backlog. Notwithstanding the backlog, however, in order to
comply with our domestic and international legal obligations, we must provide
evidentiary hearings in this context. Abridging the rights of noncitizen detainees
like Peter is not excused in times of judicial delay or because of a shortage of
resources to address our immigration crisis. Instead, this article urges fixes as
have been proposed by others21 ' to alleviate the burden on immigration courts,
rather than violation of the rights of some of the most vulnerable.
CONCLUSION

Noncitizens' rights in removal proceedings are already, and increasingly,
limited. For those noncitizens who face the prospect of removal outside the
courtroom, those rights are all but absent. For these noncitizens, who are
unrepresented, often using a language not their own to navigate a complex body
of law, and acting from behind bars in a detention center, the prospect of fighting
their removal to a third country they likely have never known is daunting. This
article calls for both an acknowledgement of this deprivation of rights, as well as
for a meaningful solution-namely, adequate notice, burden shifting, and a full
evidentiary hearing during which time the noncitizen can present her claim for
relief from deportation to a country where she faces harm or torture.
In March 2020, after nearly 18 months in immigration custody, Peter was
granted relief under CAT from South Sudan, following a hearing at which
testimony was taken from both Peter and a South Sudan country expert. At that
point - and in the midst of the Covid-19 pandemic - ICE indicated their intention
to seek Peter's removal to yet another, as yet unnamed, country. At this point,
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Peter's case had wound its way through the immigration court, the Board of
Immigration Appeals, district court and the First Circuit Court of Appeals.
Following the prospect of continued litigation, ICE ultimately agreed to release
Peter on an order of supervision. In March 2020, Peter finally returned home to
his family in New England.
In the current era, asylum law is undergoing significant change, and
protections afforded to asylum seekers and refugees are being systematically
eroded. The prospect of continuing third country deportations should frighten us
all; not only do they add to the growing list of ways in which noncitizens face
"speed" or "shadow" deportation from the United States, but such removals run
afoul of both our domestic and international legal obligations.

